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traction within those cities. Second, and on the contrary, municipalities face in-
creasing restrictions on domains such as urban planning, forced by the necessity 
to attract private investors to boost the local economy, thus, retracting the po-
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1  Introduction 
The spirits of neoliberalism once called by the cities are finally ignoring their caller‟s 
commands. This is one observation that may be made by looking at the provisional 
results of the recent crisis of the financial sector in general but also in cities, which 
especially function as trading hubs for the global financial industry. In international 
financial centres (IFCs) such as Frankfurt, which I will exclusively refer to in this 
paper, one can observe a large amount of vacant office space. This is not only a result 
of the aftermath of the recent economic crisis. In Frankfurt, for instance, both the fi-
nancial economy and the sector‟s employment temporarily experienced a significant 
downsizing. But vacant office space is also a result of the highly speculative game 
powerful international investors increasingly play on the office markets. Since real 
estate is locally and spatially confined by its very nature, both factors challenge to-
day‟s local state in the short as well as in the long run. It is often stated that global fi-
nancial investors progressively own the city and/or the built environment in cities 
(Lizieri, Baum, and Scott 2000; Lizieri and Kutsch 2006), therefore restricting the 
urban inhabitants‟ control over and their “right to the city” (Lefebvre 1968; Purcell 
2002; Harvey 2008) as well as delimiting their power with respect to decisions that 
contour the city  (Purcell  2002:  99;  cf. Peck 1998;  Tickell and Peck 1996;  Ward 
2000). 
In general, I argue that the processes of financialisation – or, in larger concep-
tual terms, neo-liberalisation – do not only destruct urban space, in fact, these proc-
esses also leads to the creation of necessary new urban space. In other words, besides 
its  disparaging  face  financialisation  also  offers  potentials  for  an  (economic)  „up-
grade‟ of a city via its built environment. This is seen as a crucial precondition for the 
ongoing global inter-urban competition pressuring the cities to bend to international 
investors. However, the resulting monetary gains might in turn contribute to maintain 
the city‟s objective of sustainable socio-economic development and encourage the 
„socially acceptable‟ redistribution of the received revenues among its citizens. 
With reference to the new adjustment of national politics and as a reaction to 
the failure of the Keynesian welfare model at the end of the 1960s – the rise of the 
paradigms of monetarism and neo-liberalism – the paper discusses two central proc- 
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esses, which not only materialise in urban spaces but, following their inherent eco-
nomic logic, reinforce each other: 
First, the volatility of the office markets in the central business district (CBD) 
of an IFC increases as an essential result of the liberalisation of the national financial 
markets and the more recent trends towards financialisation. Originally, office real 
estate could be understood as a product for usage, i.e., owner-occupied utilities, and, 
to a certain degree, also exchange. But in addition to its original functions, it has now 
transformed into a tradable – immobile – financial investment opportunity, respec-
tively into an object of “loan movements” (Lizieri 2009; Lizieri, Baum, and Scott 
2000; Vogl 2010). This transformation underlines the fact that real estate and finan-
cial markets are intrinsically linked with each other. However, a spatialised under-
standing of their linkages is crucial to the understanding of how office markets work, 
especially in cities functionally specialised on the financial sector. 
Second, since the late 1980s/early 1990s, the idea of marketisation (urban neo-
liberalism, cf. Larner 2009) unfolded in the municipal politics. Originally within the 
scope of municipal governance and control, municipalities are facing increasing re-
strictions on domains (cf. Häußermann, Läpple, and Siebel 2008: 298; Kaelble 2001) 
such as the “disposition of land” or the city‟s influence on the socio-spatial structure, 
at least in European cities, thus retracting the political space for manoeuvre with re-
spect to the varied needs of their own inhabitants. 
In terms of these two aspects, the gauntlet has been thrown at the cities particu-
larly specialised in the financial economy, because property itself has not only meta-
morphosed  into  a  multifaceted  high-yield  financial  product  but  has  also  created 
places of capital extraction (Aalbers 2009; cf. Wyly, Atia, and Hammel 2004; New-
man 2009) within the cities. This, I will discuss in the last part of the paper. 
2  Framing the argument: Financialisation 
Since the end of the 1980s, wrapped up in the phrase „neo-liberalism‟, the proclaimed 
changes in policy and economic principles entered the academic agenda almost infla-
tionary, although content wise, the term neo-liberalism was “too often treated as a 
unified totalizing set of discourses and practices” (Larner 2009: 389). Therefore and 
with regard to the argument of the paper, it appears necessary to sharpen the term‟s  
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contours to be able to bridge the characteristic features, dynamics, constellations, and 
ideas of the volatile – and increasingly speculative – office markets on the one hand, 
and the new „marketised‟ methods and changing scopes of action of the local level on 
the other. 
Margaret Hilda Thatcher and Ronald Wilson Reagan were certainly the most 
noteworthy political protagonists of the neo-liberalism in the 1980s, while the neo-
liberal basic orientation itself had already manifested in politics since the 1970s; a 
development,  which is  to  be observed  as  a consensus  basically  across all parties 
(Mudge 2008: 723). Offered definitions for the framework of neo-liberalism do not 
only stress its multiple faces (a „tri-partite of conception‟, Mudge 2008), they also re-
fer to its ability to transform and adapt, which accounts for its persistence. The latter 
traces back to a fundamental change, which culminated supra-nationally in a “new 
common sense” in (urban) politics “designed to shrink the public sector” (Larner 
2009: 386). Summarised, its change lies on 
“...the autonomous force of the market; the superiority of market or market-like 
competition over bureaucracies as a mechanism for the allocation of resources. This 
does not mean that all political elites have fully accepted these positions; it means, 
simply, that  they have  difficulty  articulating alternatives  and still retaining main-
stream political legitimacy” (Mudge 2008: 724). 
Stephanie Lee Mudge further states that, in general, “[n]eo-liberalism is dis-
tinctive with respect to other liberalisms in its drive to break the „market‟ loose in 
conceptual terms and elevate it to a level above politics – that is, to free it from po-
litical interventions of any kind” (Mudge 2008: 715; cf. Larner 2009; Vogl 2010). In 
this vein, the city has become a “commodified unit of competition in a global space 
of competition” (Schipper 2010: 23, translation SD). 
Office real estate is of weight-bearing meaning for the economy of an IFC. 
Among others, office buildings provide the physical space allocation in a city, they 
store value, and they radiate symbolic power following the imperative of today‟s in-
ter-urban competition: 
a) Provision of physical space allocation: Real estate promotes not only the 
global competitiveness of the city through the physical allocation of specific, flexible 
office space as an essential part of an IFC‟s infrastructure, but also constitutes a driv- 
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ing force for the urban economy through the (local) building industry itself (Dörry 
2009).  
b) Office space as value store due to an office building‟s investment yield, its 
rental income, its trading profit, and/or its capital value, capital flows into and out of 
the real estate markets (Lizieri 2009: 89): Eventually, the existing built form, encom-
passing both the critical mass of high-quality office space and the secondary space 
for ancillary support activities, facilitates agglomeration economies and creates the 
mass of financial activity. Both are necessary for the production of the “local buzz” 
(Bathelt, Malmberg, and Maskell 2004) and along with it go the crucial face-to-face 
meetings and knowledge spill-over, which eventually smoothen the running of the in-
formation sensitive financial sector. 
c) Symbolic competitive strength: The originating architectural skylines of the 
entrepreneurial city (Harvey 1989; Leitner 1990) express economic power. They fur-
ther symbolise global claims to leadership of the respective cities in a reinforced in-
ter-urban competition, among others, as  global centres of financial and economic 
control, in which they manage “the relationships between global flows and networks 
and local economies and societies” (Larner 2009: 385). This development is embed-
ded in a process of a rising independence of the monetary and loan relations from the 
political system whereby the nation states obviously lack not only the political means 
but also the political will to be able to react appropriately (cf. Strange 1997 [1986]). 
Before the liberalisation of the financial markets in the 1980s, the huge capital 
intensity for investments in real estate was a fundamental problem. Real estate was 
mostly financed by bank loans, which bound large amounts of capital in the long 
term, whereas its yields depended on hardly predictable factors, such as the local 
economic development or the job development in the service industry. The financing 
risks concentrated in two places: i) with the owner, who depended on stable yields to 
serve his loans, and ii) at the loan-giving bank, which bore the failure risk. This situa-
tion changed by finance innovations, which enabled the procurement of the required 
financial capital on the free financial market, where private and institutional investors 
invested in money. 
Two pre-conditions were necessary to create global investment opportunities in 
real estate: first, the process of creating transparency on the local and national office  
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markets for (inter-) national investors, and second, the liberalisation and deregulation 
of the national financial markets to ease access to loan and free the now global flows 
of capital. 
The steadily increasing geographical reach of real estate investments was car-
ried not only by financial deregulation measures and liberalisation strategies, but also 
benefitted from the actors who accomplished transparency on the local level. Real es-
tate consultant companies and brokers, such as BNP Paribas Real Estate, Cushman & 
Wakefield, Jones Lang LaSalle, or CB Richard Ellis, are among those globally active 
players  who  opt  for  international  transparency  of  the  formerly  national  markets. 
Within only two decades (1980s-2000s), each of the companies developed a tight in-
ternational  network  of  local  offices  encompassing  their  various  national  markets, 
which enables them to feed important local property market data into their global 
corporate network and/or to pass on these information to their clients, the interna-
tional investors in national property markets (cf. Dörry and Heeg 2009). However, 
transparency for the purposes of the analysis and the exploitation of new investment 
markets is also initiated by other actors, e.g., by opportunistically (high risk, high 
profit expectations) operating investors. Often, and principally in upswing market 
phases, only they enter new markets – partly profit-driven by the possibilities of the 
high leverage financing, which was especially the case in the peak time of the most 
recent property and financial boom-bust-cycle (starting with the burst of the US-
housing bubble). Engaged in such „new markets‟, opportunistic investors might sig-
nal worthwhile investment prospects to their competitors. The more competitors are 
actively investing in such markets, the denser the information about these markets 
becomes; and the less risky the final investment eventually is. However, for inves-
tors, low risk also causes low yield expectations – and the search for new high yield – 
investment product and market opportunities will start again. 
The 1980‟s liberalisation and deregulation of the financial markets in the UK 
and the US and a decade later in mainland Europe, e.g. in Germany, “and consequent 
spatial shift in international financial market activity, for example, triggered a wave 
of construction in many of the major cities in the global urban hierarchy – an office 
supply boom that in turn led to coordinated crises as cyclical falls in demand, which 
caused high vacancy levels and falling rents” (Lizieri 2009: 124). Hence, the real es-
tate construction activities in major office markets increasingly depend on the „mood‟  
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of the financial markets. The effects of the building boom and bust cycles reveal an 
increased volatility since the 1980s (and respectively the 1990s, e.g., in Germany), 
which becomes obvious for cities such as Frankfurt or London (cf. figure 1). Hence, 
massive medium and long-term effects on the affected urban economies seem to be 
unavoidable. 
Figure 1: Comparison between the Cities of London and Frankfurt am Main, 1980 – 2008 
City of London 
 
City of Frankfurt am Main 
 
Sources: PMA, various years, cf. Dörry and Heeg (2009) 
 
In previous times, large sums of capital were bound by investments in office 
buildings and new developments. Nowadays, investment capital for disposal is al-
most unlimited, at least in real estate upswing market situations. The huge capital  
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availability also eases the business of real estate transaction and site development. In 
a boom situation as it was the case in the mid-2000s, the market analyses of the glob-
ally active real estate broking companies further suggested that these investments are 
„safe‟ investments, and pre-renting contracts as important securities – and normally a 
crucial pre-condition – were largely neglected by investors. Although complex urban 
project developments were realised, the susceptibility to vacant office space rose at 
the same time due to the over-accumulation and the channelling of financial invest-
ment capital into the city. As one of the central results, this tight interrelation of the 
financial and the property markets abolished the local interplay between office mar-
kets offer and demand (Dörry and Heeg 2009) and led to the construction of a con-
siderable amount of speculatively built office space in boom phases (figure 1), caus-
ing high dynamics for the urban economies. 
The abandon of the stable Fordist growth model of the post-war period until the 
late 1960s/early 1970s by the Chicago-School‟s proclaimed monetarism marked a 
“slow but ultimate transition of commodity money towards loan money” (Vogl 2010: 
86-87, translation and highlighting SD). Debt or loan money, respectively, generated 
uncertainty and volatility in international trading and capital flows by the continuous 
foreign  exchange  rate  variations  and  therefore  currency  risks,  thus  causing  high 
transaction costs. To reduce these costs, national governments created new financial 
markets and facilitated future trading (options, futures, derivates, etc.), which were 
requirements for passing on control and security to the market and eventually inno-
vating suitable financial instruments. 
In general, a „thing‟s likelihood for commodification is a necessary prerequisite 
for its privatisation, marketisation, and financialisation, which means that „things‟ are 
progressively more “valued on strictly financial grounds” (Christophers 2010: 98). 
Having undergone these transformation processes, property today combines, among 
others, both bond-like features – rental incomes provide high and relatively stable 
cash flows – and equity-like characteristics – rental value and capital growth (Lizieri 
2009: 157) –, which make it an attractive direct and indirect investment. It is esti-
mated that the 2008‟s global investable real estate market with a total size of US$ 
12.5 trillion was made of about two thirds of direct and one third of indirect invest-
ment (Property Fund Research 2008: 4; RREEF Research 2010: 32).   
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Securitisation was one of the central financial market innovations, with which 
loans and mortgages were transformed into tradable loan packages and the liquidity 
at the financial markets was raised tremendously, allowing for the allocation of much 
more loans to very favourable conditions. Thus, the financial markets became the de-
cisive economic institution and fuelled the rise of the financial economy as a new 
economic growth engine (Heires and Nölke 2011: 43). At that moment, however, the 
added value was not primarily based on the real economy anymore (production of 
real products); but instead was now based on loans. Within this kind of loan econ-
omy, prices are only ever paid by prices; and consequently, monetary substitutes be-
came  currencies  of  the  second  order  (Vogl  2010:  94).  As  part  of  the  circulating 
money supply, they now guaranteed the highest liquidity, thus, „forcing‟ the exces-
sive financial capital to search for highly profitable investment objects, which in fact 
were not available to that extent in the real economy. With particular regard to the 
real estate markets, “[d]ebt is not just a source of capital for real estate developers 
and investors ... [but] an investment in its own right” (Lizieri 2009: 234). Although 
the sophistication of the securitised debt markets creates high returns in the real es-
tate markets, they also expose investments to high risks. However, during the so-
called „capital glut‟ of the first half of the 2000s, “the capital availability fuelled the 
growth of highly geared private real estate funds ... and it permitted listed property 
vehicles to increase the proportion of debt in capital structures” (Lizieri 2009: 234). 
By the time the financial or liquidity crisis had already been caved in, the ex-
ample of German investors show that due to their overall security and rather low 
yield orientated investments they were by far the most active exporters of real estate 
investment capital around the globe with almost 30% of all cross-border real estate 
investments. Between January 2008 and June 2009, German investors alone took 
over real estate equalling a value of US$ 27 billion in their assets. Besides, the tradi-
tional investment patterns most of these German investors – mainly open and open-
ended real estate funds, but also life insurers, private syndicates or financially strong 
private individuals – reveal a low risk readiness in the form of big, high-quality deals 
in important urban centres, characterised by the generation of steady cash-flows from 
the real estate use and therefore low but stable yields, long investment periods and a 
high equity ratio at the financing of the transaction (Real Capital Analytics 2009).  
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Besides  the  large  share  of  the  mentioned  security-oriented  investors,  other 
global investors – for instance, hedge or private equity funds – operated with the con-
trary strategy of a high risk inclination and at the same time high yield expectations 
in the market. Falling interest rates at the beginning of the turn of the millennium 
permitted them high leverage financing (with leveraging having accounted for one of 
the most aggressive financial operations, cf. Vogl 2010: 17) in terms of real estate 
purchases and project developments, which de facto led to the fact that the financing 
banks and not the investors themselves eventually bought the property. After the 
credit markets dried up in 2008, many real estate owners were forced to depreciate 
their properties as (complete) losses. Consequently, the financing banks unintention-
ally became the true real estate owners. However, against first fears the distress sales 
kept within a limit at least in Germany. The outsourced property management in 
most cases covered the loan value and running fixed costs. In turn, this allowed the 
loan giving banks to wait for the next upswing of the investment market instead of 
selling their „new‟ property with loss (fire sales, cf. Dörry 2010). 
3  Innovations in property investment vehicles: impacts on urban 
markets 
The above discussed  securitisation processes helped to  “integrate the commercial 
property lending market with the wider capital markets” (Lizieri 2009: 240) and to 
encode and commodify the office properties for share trading and exchanging on the 
international financial markets. But how did these processes work exactly? 
In his book „Towers of Capital‟, Colin Lizieri (2009) explains the overall con-
ditions and technical mechanisms in precise detail. According to him, the develop-
ment and growth of IFCs has been driving the creation of large office markets. Over 
the past two decades, patterns of property ownership in terms of their country of ori-
gin as well as the sectoral affiliation of the occupiers have vastly changed over time. 
It is estimated that in the City of London more than 40% of the prime office build-
ings have non-UK occupiers, while in Frankfurt there are more than 25% of Non-
German-occupiers (Lizieri 2009; Lizieri and Kutsch 2006: 275). Today, these office 
markets are increasingly dominated by financial firms – both as investors and users 
of that space. However, their intertwining can create systemic risk, as shocks in one 
area of the property market are transmitted throughout the whole system (figure 2).  
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Figure 2: Integration of property and financial markets 
 
Source: Lizieri (2009: 270), slightly adapted 
 
These effects will be at their most pronounced in IFC office markets. We dis-
cussed earlier that the size and complexity of property developments demand com-
plex  finance  and  funding  arrangements.  These  funds  are  provided  by  the  major 
banks, finance houses and institutional investors. But the same financial firms that 
are providing financial capital for the supply of space are the occupiers of space in 
IFC office markets themselves; either as owners or, more generally, as tenants. And 
it is those same financial firms that invest in the office buildings in IFCs – directly by 
acquiring buildings for their investment portfolios, or indirectly a) through their in-
vestment in (open and open-ended real estate) funds‟ acquiring buildings, b) by hold-
ing shares of the major property companies, which own the buildings, or c) by invest-
ing in the securitised debt products whose underlying cash flow and security is based 
on the office buildings (Lizieri 2009: 270-273). Ultimately, structure and extent of 
the demand for high-quality and expensive office space in the IFCs (rental market) 
make  office  real  estate  appear  to  be  attractive  investments  (investment  market) 
(Dörry and Heeg 2009) but also concentrate the volatility impacts of financial crises 
right there. 
The transmission of the financial market‟s boom and bust on the respective 
property markets occurs via the job development on the financial industry in its role 
as tenants of the office space. A financial crisis promotes (short-term) job losses in 
the FIRE (Finance, Insurance, Real Estate) sectors and with the job decline the rented  
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office space is usually also cut back to reduce costs. The associated rise of the va-
cancy results in decreasing rents and therefore in less realised cash flows. For inves-
tors such a development also reduces the yield of such an affected property. Gener-
ally, real estate in different finance centres is bundled up in one investment fund. 
However, office markets in IFCs usually show quite similar isochronal reactions fol-
lowing the same cyclical patterns worldwide. In the worst case, the bad performance 
of a fund affects its employment situation negatively. This crisis-like spiral can there-
fore cause chain effects in the interconnectedness of the rental with the investment 
markets, thus fuelling the strong – positive and negative – amplitudes in the devel-
opment of the specific office markets in IFCs (Dörry and Heeg 2009: 187). The ex-
ample of Frankfurt illustrates these volatility characteristics in terms of the invest-
ment markets in comparison to other German office markets, which are not shaped 
by the financial sector (however, i.e., Munich is the centre of the insurance compa-
nies in Germany, whereas Berlin heads the space intensive federal government‟s ad-
ministration; see figure 3). 
Figure 3: Volumes of transactions in the top five German office markets (2006 – Q1 2011) 
 
Source: Cushman & Wakefield (2011) 
 
Because the business actors take over the role of „active  generators‟ of the 
global finance and investment flows in IFCs, they increasingly influence the invest-
ments in office real estates in their quality as a financial category (Dörry and Heeg 
2009; Dörry 2010; Heeg 2008a, b; Scharmanski 2009). This underlines the close in-
ter-relations between the financial and real estate investment as well as rental mar-
kets and highlights the fact that real estate is directly affected by a financial crisis. 
The impacts mainly concentrate on the demand for space as employment decreases,  
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on rental and capital values as space demand decreases and a supply-driven market 
(accelerated by further completions of new developments) cuts rental income, and on 
the ability of investors and developers to acquire debt finance for their activities. 
Figure 1 illustrates that adjustment processes in the real estate sector happen at rather 
low speed due to, e.g., the supply side lags, constraints imposed by lease contracts, or 
the size of property values. On the contrary, real estate also contributes to a financial 
crisis – in particular to banking and liquidity crises, since property is a major source 
of collateral supporting business debt. Like in other sectors, declining real estate val-
ues reduce the borrowing capacity of the industry, which impacts on the investment 
activity. Further, falling real estate values reduce the value of loans secured on real 
estate and, hence, reduce the value of the banks‟ capital assets as, e.g., it was the case 
in the recent financial crisis. Banks ceased or at least heavily reduced their lending 
activity after becoming more or less the owners of the properties themselves due to 
their enormous leverage lending. In this situation, uncertainty as to the true value of 
real estate assets and liabilities can easily create information asymmetries that might 
provoke investor decisions, which in turn aggravate market difficulties. Consequently 
and with regard to their complex feedback loops, real estate markets have a causal 
impact in crisis periods and suffer directly from the effects of downturns in other as-
set and capital markets (Lizieri 2009: 215). 
4  The spirits that they’ve cited... The example of Frankfurt 
Both, Frankfurt‟s urban policy in the post-war period and Frankfurt‟s economic spe-
cialisation on the financial service industry had vast implications for its land-use and 
property market.  
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Figure 4: Localisation of rent margins of the Frankfurt office market, H1 2011 
 
Source: based on Dr. Lübke (2011: 4), slightly adapted 
 
In the early 1960s, a social democratic government declared the urban district 
Westend (encompassing the CBD, area number 1 in figure 4) a city extension area 
(City-Erweiterungsgebiet) and set the course for the novel building and usage of the 
more lucrative office space compared to the – at that time – predominant housing 
space. The original intention was to push the economic growth and to redistribute the  
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revenues to finance the provision of the infrastructural developments, such as the un-
derground  railway  network.  However,  concomitantly  and  accelerated  by  the  city 
government‟s desire to siphon revenues for further social redistribution, the lax han-
dling of the zoning plan (Bebauungsplan) fuelled massive property speculations by 
private investors in this area. In 1967, one square meter still cost 946 Deutsche Mark 
(DM), whereas in 1969 it was already 1,491 DM and in 1972 prices increased to 
2,923 DM (Vorlaufer 1975; Giese 1979). Substantial speculations and private land 
purchases  finally  resulted  in  violent  civil  protests  in  the  beginning  of  the  1970s 
(house fight); and in its aftermath the city of Frankfurt heralded a new phase of high-
rise development (cf. table 1, figure 5). 
The Framework Plan Bank Quarter (Rahmenplan Bankenviertel) concentrated 
upon only few clusters, whose city planning integration clearly differed from the pre-
ceding phases. However, such major developments both arise and arose from global 
economic forces – i.e. the growth of international financial flows, the growing con-
centration of command and control functions in global cities, and the massive techni-
cal infrastructure needed by multinational firms; driving forces that set the context 
for urban land-use conflicts on a local level – and result/ed from the negotiating in-
teractions between developers, financiers and investors, as well as politicians and 
civil society groups (cf. Fainstein 2001).  
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Figure 5: Growth of land values in different office markets in Frankfurt
2 
 
Source: Gutachterausschuss der Stadt Frankfurt am Main (2009: 61) 
 
Table 1 provides an overview of the city‟s planning schemes and therefore 
some  of  the  major  foundations  for  the  land-use  speculations  and  (inter-)national 
property investments. 
Table 1: Frankfurt high-rise framework schemes 
Scheme  Main Contents 
First high-rise plan 
(1953) 
Restriction of the high-rise locations to only a few striking 
points; 
Until 1956, realisation of far more high-rises than in the plan 
intended. 
Five Finger-Plan 
(1967/1968), not legally 
binding 
Densification corridors among five development axes in the 
Westend;  
1971 development freeze after the house fight; 
Compensation threats: building law commitments towards inves-
tors made additional permissions of the planning authorities 
necessary. 
City Master Plan (1982)  Reworking of the Finger-Plan, enlargement through additional 
development axes (high-rises in densification belts); 
                                                 
2 The City-West had been “developed“ only recently. The gentrification of the district and the construction 
of the new office and residential buildings during the late 1990s increased the land value significantly. In-
flexible and old office markets (and their investors) like Niederrad and Mertonviertel are now facing major 
problems and considerable vacancy rates due to the growing importance of competing new, modern, and 
flexible office space in other locations, such as in the City-West, Bockenheim, or the Airrail Centre Frank-
furt (The Square) at the airport.  
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Main objectives: guarantee of the investment protection with 
concurrent control of the investments, 
Preservation of the functional mix. 
Frame Plan Bank Quarter 
(1990), legal basis: land-
use plan No. 702 
Main objectives: protection of the high-rise location bank quar-
ter, 
Re-densification of the city centre. 
High-rise Development 
Plan Frankfurt 2000 
(1998) 
Restriction of the investment pressure and high-rise construction 
to three densification zones in Frankfurt: Bank Quarter, 
fair/European Quarter, Park Quarter (project Frankfurt 21 Ger-
man railways); 
Most important planning aspect: spatial centralisation of the 
high-rises (grouping concept); 
Approval of 16 new high-rise locations. 
High-rise development 
plan Frankfurt am Main 
(2008), legally binding 
since 11
th December 2008 
Failure of the project Frankfurt 21 (therefore discontinuation of 
six high-rise locations) and approval of new locations (among 
others the new building of the ECB, PalaisQuartier) explain the 
need for new high-rise development plan; 
Maintenance of the principle of grouping concept of the high-
rises; 
New: approval of high-rise locations in the city centre and other 
locations, e.g., in the central station. 
Sources: Hochhausentwicklungsplan Frankfurt am Main (update of 2008), discussed in: von Lüpke (2000) 
 
The urban Framework Plan Bank Quarter was central to the land value devel-
opment and is closely connected with the fate and disposition of the German Central 
Bank in Frankfurt following the political turn in 1990. The high-rise development 
plan Frankfurt 2000, approved of nine years later, accelerated the continuing devel-
opment of high-rise locations with the lucrative office use in central urban cities. An 
interest grouping of financial service companies and Frankfurt real estate enterprises 
had strongly campaigned for it. 
Some of the fundamental implications we are currently experiencing within the 
course of the recent economic slump in a number of the (prime) office markets in 
IFCs, were already described by Susan Fainstein (1992), using New York in the post-
1987 time period as an example. There are some obvious parallels to what was hap-
pening in Frankfurt later on. With regard to the strong linkages between real estate 
and financial markets, she claims that deliberate governmental strategies enhanced 
the office-based economy, which helped to create a huge and concentrated financial 
service sector. However, the increasing vulnerability of the city‟s fiscal situation to 
fluctuations in its key industries became the prime factor shaping New York‟s con- 
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temporary politics. With it, the economy‟s decline aggravated the real estate slump in 
the time after 1987: 
“Developers and their financial backers anticipated an ever-increasing demand 
from the securities industries and their service providers. When demand failed to ma-
terialise,  vacancies  mounted  and  a  number  of  well-known  developers  foundered 
causing their financial backers to absorb heavy losses. This further stress forced fi-
nancial  institutions  into  greater  retrenchment:  since  these  institutions  were  them-
selves among the major consumers of office space, their property-caused contraction 
further reduced the market for real estate” (Fainstein 1992: 134-5). 
Public Real Estate Management (PREM) is one element of the entrepreneurial 
city, thus, emphasising “economic growth by encouraging competitive markets and 
entrepreneurial activities” (Larner 2009: 385). With PREM, the public authorities 
aim at an optimum use and efficient utilisation of their owned real estate. Due to the 
rather limited size of the administrative area of Frankfurt, industrially used or fallow 
areas are often developed and re-valued. A central example is the Frankfurt European 
Quarter (Europaviertel, cf. table 1) currently under construction. Influences on other 
city areas can hardly be avoided: Once the planning legislation for high-rise build-
ings is reworked, increasing land value is generally the result in neighbouring sites. 
In adjacent areas to those high-rise districts, speculation fallows can often be ob-
served. 
The resulting de-coupling of office space supply and demand are, therefore, no 
innocuous developments for urban economies as it obviously delimits the options for 
(future)  political  actions  and  gives  a  more  prominent  role  to  the  private  sector: 
„These fallows or the failure to render renovations result from the fact, that in rela-
tion to an anticipated compressed construction with high-rises they do not seem prof-
itable. ... Thus, the foundation is laid for further high-rise framework development 
planning“ (Böhm-Ott 2000: 83, translation SD). 
The Bank Quarter basically defines the CBD and therefore one of Frankfurt‟s 
central locations for real estate investment activities. The following statistics (figure 
6) exemplify the CBD‟s significance for investments in  the city of Frankfurt am 




Figure 6: Distribution of investment revenues in Frankfurt office districts, in % 
   
   
 
Source: Gutachterausschuss der Stadt Frankfurt am Main (2009: 72), slighty modified 
 
5  Challenges for urban politics 
The first intention of my paper was to help understand how office markets in special-
ised cities function. Based on the example of Frankfurt, we discussed the close rela-
tionship between the evolution of major IFCs as part of the global market system, the 
development of office markets in those cities, real estate investment in those office 
markets, and the patterns of risk and return that result from the interactions between  
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financial flows and office markets. One consequence of this structural intertwining 
has been an interlocking of occupation, ownership and finance (figure 2), which cre-
ates greater potential volatility in office markets and increases the boom and bust 
amplitudes. Shocks in international financial markets are passed on to occupier, in-
vestment and property debt markets and can therefore reinforce any tendency to cy-
clical behaviour (Lizieri 2009: xi-xii). 
The second aim of my paper was to discuss some central results of the neo-
liberalisation processes both on the international financial and local office markets 
and their specific implications for the urban planning in Frankfurt. It becomes clear 
that Frankfurt‟s planning policy laid the solid groundwork for situations that enabled 
investors to actually use the window of opportunities for speculative (trans-)actions. 
In general, it is possible to identify the following three main areas of conflict: 
1) The increasing financial markets‟ pressure on Frankfurt‟s office property 
market neglects local needs. 
When international investors invest in real estate, they expect a certain yield. 
The yield return decisively depends on the value increase of the real estate. This 
arises primarily from the attainable rent and therefore from the kind of real estate use. 
In contrast to international investors, self-using or local actors normally have a bigger 
interest in local city planning, which is sensible to future urban development. Never-
theless, the location-stabilising processes pursued within this context only contribute 
to the value preservation of the real estate (Heeg 2008b). 
The influence of the local actors aiming at reconcilable and sustainable local 
planning solutions decreases with the growing dominance of international investors 
on the Frankfurt property market, while at the same time, the risk of an office real es-
tate development increases that is not aligned to the “local need situation“ (Krätke 
1995: 223, translation SD). New financial investment vehicles have contributed to 
the fragmentation of office ownership (Lizieri 2009), which increases the “distance 
between the planning authorities and the end investor and makes achievements of op-
timal decisions – particularly where these require delicate negotiations and conces-
sions – much more difficult than under traditional single ownership modes” (Lizieri 
2009: 255).  
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2) Liberalisation of financial markets increased financing of urban develop-
ment of which Frankfurt‟s land market benefited exceptionally. 
Urban development projects were realised not only on a much broader scale but 
also within a very short time period due to the availability of enormous capital in-
flows through large international investors (exemplified by the currently developed 
European Quarter in Frankfurt). Further, Frankfurt benefitted from the disproportion-
ately high tax revenues from the financial and office sectors, at least until the recent 
slump of the international financial markets. The revenues from the tax on acquisi-
tions of real estate for the city of Frankfurt accounted for about four billion EUR in 
2008 (Frankfurt am Main 2008). 
Two specific elements of Frankfurt limit the rise of real estate prices in the city 
itself, at  least  to  a certain  amount: i)  Frankfurt‟s  neighbouring  communities, e.g. 
Eschborn, strongly compete for the attraction of business with the help of a remarka-
bly low municipal multiplier on trade income (Frankfurt: 460% vs. Eschborn: 280%). 
One  of  the  most  recent  examples  of  the  movement  from  Frankfurt  to  Eschborn, 
among others, due to the tax differences, is the Deutsche Börse. ii) Frankfurt‟s real 
surface growth is nowadays strongly limited due to a shortness of constructible land. 
Whereas this factor fuels the prices for land and real estate, the factor of Frankfurt‟s 
neighbouring  communities  with  their  competitive  allocation  of  land  and  property 
largely puts caps on the real estate prices in Frankfurt. The resulting real estate prices 
are quite low in comparison to other CBDs in competing IFCs; this low cost factor in 
turn makes investments and business locations in Frankfurt highly attractive on an in-
ternational scale. 
In  the  style  of  Harvey  (1982)  but  rivalling  his  argument,  Susan  Fainstein 
(2001) denies that such huge real estate development profits would be purely para-
sitic. Rather, she argues, this kind of development has potential to create value, facili-
tate agglomeration economies, promote business efficiency, as well as to rebuild dis-
used and deteriorating areas of cities (e.g., Frankfurt-Niederrad, Mertonviertel). Nev-
ertheless, she heavily criticises the way development had been enabled by a coalition 
of real-estate developers, financial institutions, and public officials, and claims criti-
cally that this kind of coalitions first poured resources into physical redevelopment 
and then simply watched as the market collapsed in times of market downswings 
(Fainstein 2001).  
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3) The absorption of costs of urban planning and at the same time the hampered 
upgrading of public thorough fares and green areas beyond the building plots. 
The urban planning authorities are anxious to at least partly pull up profits from 
the land value increases for the financing of general concerns. Urban development 
contracts (städtebauliche Verträge) with the developers formed the basis for the as-
sumption of costs in favour of a „socially fair land-utilisation‟, for example by the in-
tegration of the housing construction in city planning, the equipment of stores, cater-
ing companies, or cultural sites with public appeal, as well as the rebuilding and the 
revaluation of public thorough fares and green areas beyond the building plots. The 
arrangements within the scope of these urban development contracts are theoretically 
a good thing. Nevertheless, because of a bulk of exceptions, they lack efficient im-
plementation particularly in regard to residential housing. It is evident that the classi-
cal intervention and welfare state focusses on its genuine duties and partially resigns 
its competence and fields of application to private actors, who can introduce specific-
complementary competencies (von Lüpke 2000: 101). With the urban development 
contract solutions, a balancing of interests has become a little easier between devel-
opers and the city administration in contrast to the classical urban land-use plans. In 
particular, on the basis of Frankfurt‟s liberal approval practice with large-scale office 
projects, the interests of the financial capital indeed has been structuring a new spa-
tial order in the city (Böhm-Ott 2000; Dörry 2009). 
6  Outlook 
Indeed, one has to admit that there are objectives of financial investors, which im-
plicitly supersede those of local actors, thus, one strictly must argue for more mixed 
property use schemes offering greater opportunities for social diversity. Such issues 
clearly lie in the hand of the respective planning policies. However, the example of 
Frankfurt showed that the discussed elements of a city‟s entrepreneurialism strategy 
are  crucially  shaped  by  its  very  specific  local  contexts  and  regulatory  traditions 
(Rodríguez, Swyngedouw, and Moulaert 2003). Since the spread of neo-liberal pol-
icy is now well established empirically, the call is now up for an explanatory debate 
on temporal disparities and geographic variations (cf. Mudge 2008; Heeg and Rosol 
2007: 506).  
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Besides large IFCs, such examinations hold especially true for office markets 
in smaller but highly specialised IFCs, such as Luxembourg. With its comparatively 
small, nevertheless powerful but highly specialised economy, a number of important 
economies  such  as  the  financial  sector  (e.g.,  Walther  and  Schulz  2009;  Walther, 
Schulz, and Dörry forthcoming), the information and communication technologies, 
or the EU-institutions demand office space; not only modern, flexible, and represen-
tative office space but also affordable secondary office space for innovative start-up 
businesses or back-office activities of the large (finance and finance-related) busi-
nesses. So far, little is known about the owner structure, trading dynamics on the real 
estate investment market, or the impacts of speculative completions in this – with re-
gard to its sheer size – still comparably diminutive office market. How did the differ-
ent actors of the financial markets, the real estate industry, and/or the city planning 
shape specific real estate and land-use trajectories in different cities? What were and 
still are the defining features of the enormous dynamism of urban property markets, 
e.g., with regard to some large-scale projects and their underlying personal relation-
ships between politicians and investors, project developers and the owners of con-
struction firms? 
A number of vital research questions, future studies, and examinations in office 
markets of IFCs ought to be addressed, be they Frankfurt, Paris, Luxembourg, Mos-
cow, or London. We need a better understanding of these phenomena, since residen-
tial and office markets will further compete for the scarce resource of available space 
in the city, thus, reinforcing the debate on the right to the city. 
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